Secrets: Happy vs Hermes Agent and OpenClaw
How Happy keeps API keys from the model is on Secrets.
How Happy compares with Hermes Agent and OpenClaw
Three designs for the same problem, from each project's own documentation.
| Happy | Hermes Agent | OpenClaw | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Where values live | SQLite on the agent's machine: plaintext JSON, file 0600, directory 0700 | ~/.hermes/.env, plus Bitwarden, 1Password, or a command helper synced at startup | Where a SecretRef points: env, file, exec, or the store in the state SQLite, unencrypted, 0600 and 0700 |
| How a value gets in | A reviewed tool call, the Desktop dialog, or the API | hermes config set or .env; managers load on start | Control UI, CLI, or dotenv import; the secrets tool asks a person, in a masked prompt |
| What a command receives | Only the bundles it names, in a fresh shell, on the daemon's machine | A sanitized environment; only terminal.env_passthrough names | secret kind: not injected by default; env kind: plaintext; with the egress proxy, a sentinel swapped only toward allowed hosts |
| Scope | Agent, workspace, or project; chosen per command | The agent process | Gateway-wide, team-scoped; allowed hosts for egress |
Hermes Agent by Nous Research keeps API keys in ~/.hermes/.env and non-secret settings in config.yaml, with command-line flags above the config and the config above .env; logs are redacted automatically. At startup it can pull more from Bitwarden Secrets Manager through bws, from 1Password through op:// references, or from a shell command that prints KEY=VALUE lines, in a precedence ladder across sources, with an optional AES-GCM encrypted cache for Bitwarden. Terminal commands, code execution, and cron scripts run with the managed credentials stripped from their environment; a skill's required_environment_variables or the terminal.env_passthrough list lets named ones through (Hermes docs).
OpenClaw replaces a plaintext credential in its config with a SecretRef of source env, file, exec, or store, one credential at a time; plaintext keeps working. The store holds two kinds: secret, write-only with no reveal call, and env, readable by agents. Model-provider credentials stay in the Gateway process as sentinels until the egress proxy substitutes them, which its documentation describes as not a process-isolation boundary (runtime model). The secrets tool lets the agent request a credential by name, reason, and hosts; a person supplies it, chat channels get a link rather than the value, and there is deliberately no action that writes a value the agent supplies (tool). The CLI refuses --value for the secret kind and soft-deletes for 30 days; an audit, configure, apply workflow migrates existing config, with exec recipes for 1Password, Bitwarden, Vault, pass, and sops.